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RUPA DUTTAGUPTA and ANTONIO SPILIMBERGO*
After the large exchange rate depreciations following the 1997 East Asian crisis,
export volumes from East Asian countries responded with a notable lag. Two main
explanations for this lag have been proposed: that contraction in domestic credit
affected supply of exports and that “competitive depreciation” by other countries
neutralized the effects on demand for exports. This paper considers the plausibil-
ity of these two mechanisms using a new monthly database of exports of selected
industries. The results indicate that “competitive depreciation” played an impor-
tant role in the propagation of the East Asian crisis through the trade channel, even
at a monthly frequency. [JEL F1, F14]
D
uring the financial crisis in 1997–98, export revenues of many East Asian
countries did not increase in spite of massive depreciation by the afflicted
economies.1 The depreciations led to sharp declines in dollar-denominated export
prices with only modest increases in export volumes. The absence of a quick response
of exports to depreciation played a key role in prolonging the East Asian crisis and
is puzzling from an analytical point of view.
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Expenditure Policy Division of the Fiscal Affairs Department at the International Monetary Fund, and a
Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy and Research and the William Davidson Institute. They
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1Henceforth “Asia” will refer to the following six economies in this sample: Hong Kong SAR,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. China, Philippines, and Taiwan Province of
China could not be included in the sample because of lack of data.WHAT HAPPENED TO ASIAN EXPORTS DURING THE CRISIS?
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Several plausible factors could underlie the sluggish response of East Asian
exports to the huge depreciations following the currency crisis. First, demand for
Asian exports may have been price inelastic in the short run. Second, the contraction
of credit to the private sector may have limited the supply of exports. Third, demand
may have slowed down in response to an exogenous shift in world demand. Finally,
demand for exports in a single country could have slowed because of “competitive
depreciations” by others. These different hypotheses lead to very different inter-
pretations of the Asian crisis, its propagation mechanisms, and the policy recom-
mendations for recovery. This paper considers these alternative hypotheses. To
address this question, a new monthly data set on price and quantity of exports for
selected commodity groups is constructed. Using these data, demand and supply for
Asian exports are analyzed within a vector cointegration framework of estimation.
The empirical results indicate that the demand for East Asian exports is very
sensitive to prices—both own and competitors’—and to world growth rate. The
supply prices of exports are generally insensitive to own quantities but very sensi-
tive to nominal exchange rate changes. Typically, a nominal depreciation decreases
the U.S. dollar-denominated export price, thereby increasing the demand for the
depreciating country’s exports. However, depreciation of every export competitor’s
currency weakens the positive demand effect of the initial depreciation such that
the overall effect is a fall in export prices with a very modest increase in export vol-
umes. In this context, evidence of a correspondence between export supply price
and contraction of credit to the private sector is somewhat mixed.
The importance of trade in the transmission of the East Asian crisis has been
studied both empirically and theoretically. Empirically, Glick and Rose (1999);
Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado (2000); and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999)
look at market shares in trade for evidence of a contagion effect through the trade
channel. These authors conclude that the trade shares are important in explaining
currency crises in general (see, for instance, Glick and Rose, 1999) and the crisis
in East Asia in particular.2Abeysinghe (2001) uses a structural vector auto regres-
sion model during 1983–1998 at quarterly frequency to analyze the transmission
of recessions across 12 Asian economies through their trade links. Thus, looking
at trade shares constitutes an important first step in analyzing the role of trade in
crises. However, for explicit comparisons of the alternative explanations behind
export slowdown, it becomes necessary to estimate the underlying structural demand
and supply equations, which is done in this paper. Moreover, this paper is among the
few studies on the East Asian currency crisis that uses a unique database with coun-
tries’disaggregated trade data at a monthly frequency.3 The use of high-frequency
data permits the analysis of the relative speeds of adjustment of export volumes and
prices in response to external shocks. Gerlach and Smets (1995) formalize the
2However, not all economists agree that trade has played an important role. For instance, Kaminsky
and Reinhart (2000) argue that the trade links between East Asian countries are not strong enough to explain
the spread of the crisis.
3Barth and Dinmore (1999) also study the movements of trade prices and aggregate volumes in East
Asia during the crisis at monthly frequency. They find that although the export prices of the East Asian
countries (Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, and Thailand) fell
by 4.8 percent in 1997 and 9.1 percent in 1998, their aggregate export volumes went up by 8.8 percent in
1997 and only 0.7 percent in 1998.Rupa Duttagupta and Antonio Spilimbergo
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idea— in a theoretical model—that strong competition in the external sector can
be responsible for the transmission of a currency crisis. This paper is an empirical
validation of the same idea in the context of East Asia.
I. Overview of Aggregate East Asian Exports
The export performances of the six East Asian countries in this study were remark-
able between 1981 and 1995. On average, export revenues grew by 12 percent a
year, with continuous positive year-to-year growth rates, except in 1983 and 1985.
Starting in 1995, however, export growth rates declined—exports became virtually
stagnant in 1996 and 1997, declined in 1998, and recovered only after the second
half of 1999 (Figure 1).4
The decrease in export revenues toward the end of the 1990s was primarily led










1990m1 1991m1 1992m1 1993m1 1994m1 1995m1 1996m1 1997m1 1998m1 1999m1 2000m1 2001m1 2002m1 2003m1
monthly revenues  moving average of revenues
1997 m7
Figure 1. Monthly East Asian Exports
(In billion U.S. dollars)
4In order to control for the seasonality of export revenues, both the actual monthly export revenues
and a moving annual average are reported. The decline in exports from the first half of 2001 reflects in
part a slowdown in world economic activity starting in 2001.
5Several authors have explored the export slowdown at the end of 1995. Fernald, Edison, and Loungani
(1999) show that the Chinese effective devaluation in 1994 did not change the trade shares in the rest of Asia
and hence did not cause the Asian crisis. Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998a and 1998b) suggest that the
sharp appreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to the Japanese yen and European currencies since the sec-
ond half of 1995 led to deteriorating cost-competitiveness in most Asian countries whose currencies were
effectively pegged to the dollar. In addition, there was a price war in the electronic sector, which accounted
for an important export share in several Asian countries. The weak economic growth in Japan and the over-
investment in these countries were the cause of the price war in 1995. This industry is included in this study
in recognition of its importance in the development of the crisis. Finally, Chinn (1998) finds that while some
Asian currencies, like those of Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand, were overvalued before the crises, some
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Figure 3. East Asian Export Price Versus Export Volume
thereafter, while export volumes continued to grow before the crisis and slowed
gradually after September 1997 (Figures 2 and 3). Figure 3 presents the East Asian
export data in a price-quantity space, which allows analysis of the actual price-
quantity equilibrium points over time. Two distinct patterns are observed. In the
period 1989 until June 1995 prices and volumes expanded continuously, with aRupa Duttagupta and Antonio Spilimbergo
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sharp spike in price during the first semester of 1995. Thereafter, export prices fell
almost continuously with little response in volumes, especially after June 1997.
The last period is the most striking and is the focus of this analysis.
Figure 4 shows that the share of East Asian exports in total world imports in-
creased almost without interruption between 1987 and 1995, but started declining
in 1996. This supports the view that the export decline was specific to East Asia and
cannot be explained by worldwide demand slowdown, and hence emphasizes the
need to focus on this region.6
II. The Model and Estimation Methodology and Regression Results
Data and Model
The analysis focuses on disaggregated Asian manufacturing exports.7 Three broad
export groups are considered (chemicals, manufactures, and machinery) correspond-
ing to Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) codes 5, 6, and 7, the sum
of which represents over 70 percent of exports for Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore,
and 60 percent for Thailand. In addition to these three broad categories, three other
specific industries (vehicles, clothing, and semiconductors), corresponding to SITC
codes 78, 84, and 776, respectively, are also considered.8 These subindustries have
6Moreover, as shown in Table 1 in the next section, the share of world import demand for the products
that were exported by these countries in total world import demand did not decline during this period, imply-
ing that the Asian export decline did not result from a switch of world demand toward other commodities.
7Muscatelli, Stevenson, and Montagna (1994) provide evidence of the increasing importance of
manufacturing exports (relative to traditional or primary exports) in Southeast Asia in the 1990s.
8For Korea and Thailand, data on road vehicles (SITC 78) could not be retrieved. Instead we included
data on passenger cars (SITC 7812).
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played important roles in Asian trade.9 Clothing, being labor-intensive, has tradition-
ally been a very important export product for developing countries at the initial stages
of industrialization, making this sector an interesting case for studying the effects
of depreciation. The semiconductor industry is relatively new but it is already very
important in most of East Asia. It is characterized by large initial investment, reliance
on large volumes to cover the initial outlays, and a very high rate of technological
innovation, making it highly cyclical and sensitive to price competition.10 The road
vehicle industry is also very important for the development strategy of Korea and
Indonesia. The original sources for all the data are described in detail in the appendix.
Table 1 reports the share of particular commodity exports as a percentage of
total exports. Manufactures and machinery items constitute a significant proportion
9For similar reasons Fernald, Edison, and Loungani (1999) focused on semiconductors and clothing in
their study of Chinese exports.
10For a description of the highly competitive nature of the semiconductor industry, see Macher, Mowery,
and Hodges (1999). This industry includes several products—for example, integrated circuits and memory
devices. Memory devices are highly standardized and competition is mainly through price and timely deliv-
ery. The external market for memory devices has had three characteristic phases—the United States domi-
nated this market prior to 1985, Japan dominated it between 1985 and 1990, and since 1990, the Newly
Industrialized Economies have been increasing their market shares.
Table 1. Share of Specific Commodity Sections Out of Total Exports
(In percent)
Semi-
Chemicals Manufactures Machinery Vehicles Clothing conductors
Hong 1995 4.0 11.1 29.4 0.0 31.9 7.5
Kong 1998 3.5 9.5 24.4 0.0 39.3 9.5
SAR 2000 3.4 8.7 24.5 0.0 42.2 10.7
Indonesia 1995 3.4 23.0 8.4 0.8 7.4 0.3
1998 4.3 18.0 9.5 0.6 5.4 0.4
2000 5.1 19.9 17.3 0.8 7.6 1.2
Korea 1995 7.2 22.0 52.5 8.1 4.0 15.5
1998 7.7 21.6 49.2 8.9 3.5 14.7
2000 8.0 17.6 58.2 9.0 2.9 14.3
Malaysia 1995 3.0 8.8 55.1 0.6 3.1 17.9
1998 3.5 8.3 59.2 0.7 3.1 19.0
2000 3.8 6.9 62.5 0.4 2.3 19.1
Singapore 1995 6.0 6.3 65.6 1.0 1.2 15.6
1998 6.5 4.5 66.4 0.8 1.3 17.7
2000 7.0 3.8 67.4 0.7 1.3 25.0
Thailand 1995 4.4 11.7 33.6 1.3 8.9 5.2
1998 4.5 11.7 40.8 2.4 6.6 5.9
2000 5.9 11.7 43.7 3.6 5.5 8.5
Memorandum item: World demand for specific commodities in total world demand
1995 10.0 16.1 37.8 2.6 8.7 3.4
1998 9.9 15.0 40.3 2.6 9.1 3.6
2000 9.5 13.7 40.8 3.2 8.6 3.5Rupa Duttagupta and Antonio Spilimbergo
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of total exports for all the sample countries. Among machinery items, semi-
conductors account for a large proportion of exports for Korea, Malaysia, and
Singapore. However, these shares did not change much between the precrisis (1995)
and postcrisis (1998) periods. Table 1 also confirms that the total world demand
for the specific commodities exported by the Asian countries did not decline during
1995 and 1998, implying that the export decline was specific to Asia and not a
result of a switch in composition of world import demand.
The aggregate data hide important heterogeneity in the composition and desti-
nation of exports. Tables 2 through 4 report the percentage of commodity-specific
exports that each Asian country exports to its five Asian competitors (Table 2), to
the United States (Table 3), and to Japan (Table 4). Table 2 shows that these countries
engaged in substantial intra-Asian trade. After the crisis, the share of Asian trade
declined for almost all commodity groups. The share of many of these commodities
to the United States (Table 3) and Japan (Table 4) also declined after the crisis,
implying that the depreciations did not lead to a significant increase in foreign
demand for the Asian exports.
The sample data set is not readily available in any existing database at a monthly
frequency. The database has been constructed from the original national sources.
Unfortunately, for many commodity groups in the sample, only data on export rev-
enues are available—that is, the data are not disaggregated into export prices and
volumes for each commodity analyzed in the paper. Therefore, aggregate price data
Table 2. Asian Exports to Each Other: 
Percentage of Specific Exports to Asian Partners
(In percentage of total exports of specific commodities)
Semi-
Chemicals Manufactures Machinery Vehicles Clothing conductors
Hong 1995 10.4 10.1 18.4 7.7 0.9 32.1
Kong 1998 7.3 8.1 12.3 1.6 0.3 20.8
SAR 2000 12.1 7.6 14.3 14.1 0.4 22.2
Indonesia 1995 32.1 25.8 42.1 55.3 4.3 62.7
1998 31.6 22.0 42.6 31.0 2.5 54.6
2000 30.9 23.0 41.5 29.0 3.4 44.0
Korea 1995 25.9 27.4 17.9 5.4 1.6 30.0
1998 16.6 19.2 14.9 1.1 2.5 30.7
2000 18.3 19.2 13.4 3.0 1.1 29.2
Malaysia 1995 46.0 38.7 34.3 27.2 7.4 34.4
1998 36.7 36.7 28.6 14.9 4.9 31.4
2000 41.1 34.9 32.4 27.3 4.8 43.6
Singapore 1995 46.2 53.2 33.7 36.2 8.0 41.9
1998 37.1 43.8 27.8 23.2 5.0 38.3
2000 34.7 48.3 33.7 37.9 5.5 40.3
Thailand 1995 53.3 25.9 34.4 15.2 9.4 40.5
1998 34.7 19.8 23.4 5.9 1.9 27.2
2000 38.3 19.2 24.6 7.8 2.0 29.4WHAT HAPPENED TO ASIAN EXPORTS DURING THE CRISIS?
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Table 3. Asian Exports of Specific Commodities to the United States
(In percentage of total exports of specific commodities)
Semi-
Chemicals Manufactures Machinery Vehicles Clothing conductors
Hong 1995 0.9 9.6 19.2 4.3 48.1 29.1
Kong 1998 1.0 12.4 17.6 1.3 47.1 26.8
SAR 2000 1.4 15.0 18.7 8.0 45.5 28.7
Indonesia 1995 3.4 7.4 24.4 11.2 32.5 23.5
1998 5.4 11.4 15.2 10.4 45.3 14.8
2000 6.2 10.0 14.7 8.0 42.6 7.1
Korea 1995 4.8 8.4 25.7 22.1 36.8 34.1
1998 6.9 12.9 21.6 18.9 44.4 27.0
2000 6.6 13.0 27.2 37.3 48.6 22.3
Malaysia 1995 9.3 6.8 29.3 3.2 48.7 33.5
1998 10.3 8.1 28.5 7.7 54.2 30.9
2000 10.0 8.8 25.7 5.3 53.3 19.7
Singapore 1995 7.6 2.3 24.1 3.9 53.4 20.3
1998 6.5 3.6 25.5 5.1 54.0 20.8
2000 5.9 4.8 21.6 3.0 56.8 18.6
Thailand 1995 2.3 13.6 20.6 6.3 24.9 21.8
1998 2.7 17.8 24.3 4.0 50.1 23.1
2000 3.5 18.6 20.4 2.7 54.0 21.0
Table 4. Asian Exports of Specific Commodities to Japan
(In percentage of total exports of specific commodities)
Semi-
Chemicals Manufactures Machinery Vehicles Clothing conductors
Hong 1995 2.8 2.4 4.6 0.3 3.2 5.1
Kong 1998 2.0 0.9 5.8 0.3 1.0 7.0
SAR 2000 1.6 1.6 5.0 1.1 0.7 4.5
Indonesia 1995 8.9 22.7 7.6 6.0 10.0 7.1
1998 7.3 13.0 16.2 8.7 4.5 14.0
2000 8.9 17.9 15.7 14.5 3.9 29.7
Korea 1995 10.2 12.9 8.5 1.5 37.0 15.3
1998 7.9 8.7 5.7 1.0 20.6 8.7
2000 8.3 9.4 8.3 1.2 21.4 11.4
Malaysia 1995 10.8 14.7 9.4 3.8 5.0 7.9
1998 9.7 11.5 8.7 3.2 4.4 6.8
2000 11.1 15.0 10.9 4.0 5.6 8.3
Singapore 1995 5.3 3.5 7.6 3.2 4.3 8.6
1998 5.0 4.6 6.4 5.1 3.2 6.3
2000 5.2 3.5 6.6 4.7 2.3 6.3
Thailand 1995 8.9 11.3 15.3 6.0 9.9 16.5
1998 10.2 9.3 12.6 7.1 8.0 18.0
2000 10.4 12.7 14.3 6.3 7.2 14.4Rupa Duttagupta and Antonio Spilimbergo
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for the relevant industries are used to deflate revenues and obtain export vol-
umes. Country- and industry-specific competitors’ price indices are constructed as
weighted sums. Weights are constructed as the market shares of each Asian competi-
tor in the total Asian market by particular industry. The construction of the data set is
described in the appendix.
We estimate a standard reduced-form long-run equation of demand for exports,
specified as follows (in logarithmic form):11
(1)
where  = constant term in the demand equation; Xijt = volume of the ith com-
modity exported by the jth country at time t; Pijt = export price of the ith commod-
ity (in dollars) exported by the jth country at time t;  = competitors’export price
for commodity i as faced by country j at time t;  = world real import demand at
time t; and  = residual term in the demand regression.
Based on standard economic theory, an increase in own price should decrease
the demand for own exports, while an increase in competitors’ price or world
demand should increase it 
The reduced-form long-run (inverted) supply equation is given by
(2)
where  = constant term in the supply equation; Ejt = nominal exchange rate in
country jat time t; DCjt =credit to the private sector in country jat time t; Ijt =domes-
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d =+ + + + αα α α ,
11See Goldstein and Khan (1985) for a discussion on specifications of trade equations. Note that
although in principle own and competitors’ prices should enter the demand equation as a ratio (standard
assumption of price homogeneity), we enter them separately because P
c
ijt is only a close but not precise
proxy for competitors’ price.
12The empirical literature on whether nominal devaluation results in real devaluation is quite com-
prehensive. See Reinhart (1995) and the references therein.
13The sign of the coefficient on private sector credit also tests the possibility that a credit crunch could
have slowed down export supply during the crisis. While some authors (e.g., Ghosh and Ghosh, 1999; and
Ferri and Kang, 1999) have analyzed the impact of a credit crunch on the entire economy, we focus on its
effect on specific exports.
The export supply curve is expected to have a nonnegative slope  A
nominal depreciation should reduce the export supply price expressed in dollars
although the extent of price decline depends on the pass-through elas-
ticity.12 An increase in private sector credit is expected to facilitate export supply,
thereby reducing its price  13 Finally, an increase in domestic input price βij
dc < () 0.
βij
e < () 0,
βij
v ≥ () 0.
is expected to manifest in an increase in the export price 
Time Series Properties and Single Equation Approach
As a first step the stationarity of the data series is evaluated. The Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (1979) and Phillips-Perron (1988) tests are both used to check for the
βij
w > () 0.WHAT HAPPENED TO ASIAN EXPORTS DURING THE CRISIS?
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presence of unit roots in the variables used in estimation.14 For each of the six series
in every country, the existence of unit roots cannot be rejected by at least one of the
two tests, and sometimes by both, at the 1 percent level of significance. For the
same variables, however, the existence of a unit root in the first difference is always
rejected, indicating that the variable series are integrated of order one (I(1)).15
Next, the individual export demand and supply equations are tested for the
existence of co-integration, using residual-based Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests
given in Engle and Yoo (1987).16 Given that the sample residuals exhibit AR(1), the
long-run co-integration relationships are estimated using generalized least squares
(GLS), with the Cochrane-Orcutt methodology. Time trends are also used in the
regression, but not restricted to the co-integrated relationships. The results confirm
the existence of co-integration for most commodities at the 5 percent level of sig-
nificance. The demand curves generally confirm the standard negative relationship
of export volume with own price and positive relationship with competitors’ price
and world demand (Table 5).17 The individual export supply equations estimated
indicate a flat supply curve in most cases, although the export price coefficients are
sometimes negative (Table 6). While the export supply price has a positive and sig-
nificant relationship with domestic input price and negative and significant rela-
tionship with the nominal exchange rate, the coefficient of private credit entering
the supply equation is generally insignificantly different from zero.
The results for the individual long-run demand equations are summarized as
follows: (i) own price elasticity is negative and significant but generally less than 1;
(ii) competitors’price elasticity is positive and significant and generally greater than
1;18 and (iii) world demand elasticity is usually greater than 1 and significant. The
results for the long-run supply equations are these: (i) the supply price is relatively
inelastic to quantity; (ii) the pass-through elasticity between nominal exchange rate
and export supply price is negative and significant; (iii) there is a positive and sig-
nificant relationship between domestic input price and export price; and (iv) the
effect of private credit on export price is insignificant.
In addition, the individual long-run equations are used for the following robust-
ness tests and sensitivity analyses: (i) the existence of price homogeneity in the
demand equation; and (ii) a structural break test in both equations. The hypothesis
of price homogeneity in the demand equations is generally rejected. The few cases
14The Bayesian Information Criterion is used to determine the optimal lag length.
15Notable exceptions are export volume of manufactures and clothing in Hong Kong SAR, chemicals
and semiconductors in Indonesia, manufactures and clothing in Korea, vehicles and clothing in Malaysia,
and chemicals and miscellaneous manufactures in Singapore. These series appeared to be trend-stationary.
16The details of this methodology, including the critical values for the significance of co-integration,
are in Maddala and Kim (1999). Note however that the sample spans only 11 years, which may be too short
to establish a “long-run” relationship. Hence, the power of these tests would generally be low.
17The exception is the case of Hong Kong SAR, which shows a negatively sloping demand curve.
18Compared with these results, Muscatelli, Stevenson, and Montagna (1994) found, for a sample of
Asian countries, that the long-run elasticity of export demand with respect to own price relative to competi-
tors’price is generally much greater than 1. Noting that estimation of the export commodities in this study is
done at a more disaggregated level, own price and competitors’price are allowed to enter the demand equa-
tion independently, although price homogeneity is tested as a robustness check (see below).Rupa Duttagupta and Antonio Spilimbergo
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in which this hypothesis is not rejected are when price indices are defined impre-
cisely (due to lack of data on actual prices). With some exceptions (e.g., Indonesia),
results do not reveal structural breaks.19
Table 5. Co-integration Results for Single Equation Demand Estimation
Co-integration  Coefficient1
at the 5 Percent 
Level of  Competitors’ World 
Country Industry Significance Own price price demand
Hong Kong Chemicals YES 2.0 0.0 1.1
SAR Manufactures YES 1.0 0.0 1.0
Machinery YES 1.9 0.7 0.9
Semiconductors YES 0.0 1.4 0.7
Clothing YES 1.3 0.0 0.0
Korea Chemicals YES −1.2 1.6 0.6
Manufactures YES 0.0 1.0 1.0
Machinery NO −0.4 1.1 1.7
Passenger cars NO 0.0 7.5 2.2
Semiconductors YES −0.8 0.0 0.5
Clothing YES −3.1 0.0 0.7
Singapore Chemicals NO −1.0 0.7 1.0
Manufactures NO 0.5 0.8 1.3
Machinery YES −0.6 0.0 1.3
Thailand Chemicals YES 0.0 0.0 1.3
Manufactures YES −0.7 0.7 1.1
Machinery YES −0.6 1.5 1.0
Passenger cars YES 0.0 0.0 2.1
Semiconductors YES −0.6 1.9 0.6
Clothing NO −0.6 1.2 0.5
Indonesia Chemicals YES −0.9 0.6 1.0
Manufactures YES −0.9 0.0 0.6
Machinery YES −0.9 0.0 0.0
Road vehicles YES −0.9 2.0 0.7
Semiconductors NO 0.0 0.0 0.0
Clothing YES −0.7 0.0 0.0
Malaysia Chemicals YES −0.6 1.2 0.6
Manufactures YES −0.9 1.6 0.7
Machinery YES −0.8 2.5 0.9
Road vehicles YES −0.8 0.0 1.0
Semiconductors YES −0.8 2.1 0.4
Clothing NO −1.2 2.0 0.9
1Actual coefficient values are reported only if the variable is significantly different from zero at
the 5 percent level of significance.
19The Chow predictive test (Greene, 1997, Chapter 7) is used to check for the possibility of a struc-
tural break in demand or supply in July 1997, when the financial crisis started, and in December 1997,
when Korea devalued. Andrews’ (1993) method of testing for a structural break (when the break point is
unknown) is also used, restricting the breakpoint to between July 1997 and December 1997. The results
indicate no structural break in demand or supply functions.WHAT HAPPENED TO ASIAN EXPORTS DURING THE CRISIS?
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Table 6. Co-integration Results for Single Equation Supply Estimation
Co-integration  Coefficient1
at the 5 Percent 
Level of  Export Private  Nominal Input 
Country Industry Significance volume credit exchange rate price
Hong Kong Chemicals YES 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1
SAR Manufactures YES 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1
Machinery YES 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1
Semiconductors YES 0.0 −0.3 0.0 2.1
Clothing YES 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Korea Chemicals YES 0.0 0.0 −0.3 0.9
Manufactures YES 0.0 0.0 −0.4 0.7
Machinery YES 0.0 0.0 −0.2 0.6
Passenger cars YES 0.0 0.0 −0.3 0.9
Semiconductors YES 0.0 0.0 −0.3 0.9
Clothing YES 0.0 0.0 −0.3 1.0
Singapore Chemicals YES 0.0 0.0 −0.8 0.2
Manufactures YES 0.0 0.0 −0.9 0.0
Machinery YES 0.0 0.0 −0.7 0.0
Thailand Chemicals YES 0.0 0.0 −0.4 1.2
Manufactures YES 0.0 0.0 −0.4 0.9
Machinery YES −0.1 0.0 −0.3 0.0
Passenger cars YES 0.0 0.0 −0.3 0.0
Semiconductors YES 0.0 0.0 −0.3 0.0
Clothing YES 0.0 0.0 −0.4 0.8
Indonesia Chemicals YES −0.1 0.0 0.0 −0.9
Manufactures YES −0.2 −0.2 0.3 −0.9
Machinery YES −0.1 0.0 0.3 −0.9
Road vehicles YES −0.1 0.0 0.0 −0.8
Semiconductors YES 0.0 −0.8 0.0 −1.3
Clothing YES −0.1 0.0 0.0 −1.0
Malaysia Chemicals YES −0.1 −0.3 −0.6 1.3
Manufactures YES −0.1 −0.3 −0.7 1.3
Machinery YES −0.9 −0.3 −0.6 1.3
Road vehicles YES 0.0 −0.4 −0.6 1.3
Semiconductors YES −0.1 −0.3 −0.6 1.3
Clothing YES 0.0 −0.4 −0.6 1.3
1Actual coefficient values are reported only if the variable is significantly different from zero at
the 5 percent level of significance.Rupa Duttagupta and Antonio Spilimbergo
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The above results reveal a poor fit in some of the individual long-run 
relationships—the estimated demand and supply curves have perverse slopes in some
cases (e.g., Hong Kong’s export demand curves and Indonesia and Malaysia’s export
supply curves). This could be because the estimations suffer from relatively small
sample sizes—as indicated above, the sample may be too short to capture long-run
relationships. Mark and Sul (1999) have shown that there are sizable gains from pool-
ing the data. Kao and Chiang (2000) have compared different estimation techniques
for panel data in the presence of co-integration and have found that the dynamic gen-
eralized least squares (DGLS) outperforms both ordinary least squares (OLS) and
fully modified OLS.20 This supports the use of a panel estimation to analyze the
above export demand and supply relationships, which is done in the next section.
Empirical Results: Panel Approach
Based on the confirmation of the existence of co-integration in a majority of the
demand and supply equations, the long-run demand and supply are estimated in lev-
els in a panel context, using the DGLS methodology of Stock and Watson (1989) as
described in Campbell and Perron (1991). This methodology corrects for (i) serial
correlation (as discussed above, the sample residuals exhibit AR(1)) using GLS; and
(ii) endogeneity of the regressors by including lags and leads of changes in the
explanatory variables. The long-run specification for the demand equation is
(3)
where Ms = monthly dummies that control for seasonal effects; 
and for  Z = op, cp, y, corresponding to the variables’own price,
competitors’ price, and world demand, respectively; and L is the lag operator
while L−1 is the lead operator.21
The long-run specification for the supply equation is
(4)
PX E D C I f L X
gL X fLE gL E f LD C





























=+ + + + + ()
+ () + () + () + ()
+ () + () + ()
−−
−−

















k −− () = ∑
1





Z () = ∑
XP P Y d L P
eL P dLP eL P






































=+ + + + ()
+ () + () + ()













20See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2000) for an application of panel dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS).
21The integer k denotes the number of lags (or leads) and is chosen in the following manner: starting
with a reasonable upper bound of k, on estimation, if the variable (with the highest possible lag) is signif-
icant, then k is chosen to be the upper bound. If the variable is not significant, the lag length is reduced
further until the last included lag is significant in the estimation. A similar method is used to choose the
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where for  Z = v, e, dc, w, corresponding to
export volume, nominal exchange rate, private credit, and input price, respec-
tively. Again, the optimum number of leads and lags is chosen as in the demand
regression.
The specifications for short-run demand and supply are
(5)
(6)
The terms EDijt−1 and ESijt−1 are the one-period-lagged error correction terms from
the long-run demand and supply regressions, where
(7)
(8)
Equations 3 to 6—corresponding to the long-run and short-run demand and sup-
ply equations—are estimated using GLS with the pooled data, after allowing for
first-order autocorrelation in the error structure as well as heteroskedasticity across
countries. The panel comprises exports from Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea,
Singapore, and Thailand for the period March 1993 to July 2002.22, 23 We drop
Malaysia from the sample as it has very few observations overlapping with data for
the other countries in this sample. Besides using monthly dummies to control for sea-
sonality as before, country dummies are used to control for country-specific effects.
The panel estimation results are given in Table 7.24 The results indicate a stan-
dard demand equation for Asian exports.25 Price elasticity of demand for each
export commodity is negative and significant at the 5 percent level of significance.
Similarly, competitors’price elasticity is positive and significant except for clothing.
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22To achieve a balanced panel, we use the rate of growth of the export price from Singapore to obtain
an additional six months of data for Hong Kong in 2002. Our results do not change if we do not include
the last six months of observations for which we do not have data.
23Using a Hausman test we could not reject a random effects model, that is, GLS is more efficient.
Note that for road vehicles (SITC 78) the panel is imprecise, since the Korean and Thai data are for pas-
senger cars (SITC 7812).
24The panel on road vehicles has three countries (Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand) as Hong Kong SAR
has an insignificant export of vehicles, and Singaporean data beyond the one-digit level could not be
retrieved. For all other one-digit commodity groups we have five countries.
25See also Faini, Clavijo, and Senhadji-Semlali (1992); Muscatelli, Stevenson, and Montagna (1994);
and Reinhart (1995).Rupa Duttagupta and Antonio Spilimbergo
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Table 7. Estimation Results (Panel Approach)1
Long-run demand: Dependent variable = Xit
Explanatory
Coefficients in the individual regressions
variables Chemicals Manufactures Machinery Vehicles Semiconductors Clothing
Pit −0.63 −0.75 −0.79 −0.74 −0.48 −1.16
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
P
c
it 0.56 1.18 1.408 0.69 1.68 0.04
(0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.90)
Y
w
t 1.71 0.50 1.55 1.68 1.81 −0.14
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16)
Log 547.90 667.43 556.33 48.36 398.83 364.08
likelihood
Countries 5 5 5 3 4 4
Number of  630 630 630 400 420 500
observations
Short-run demand: Dependent variable =∆ Xit
Explanatory
Coefficients in the individual regressions
variables Chemicals Manufactures Machinery Vehicles Semiconductors Clothing
∆Pit−1 −0.26 0.01 0.20 0.12 −0.14 0.60
(0.17) (0.95) (0.45) (0.62) (0.39) (0.00)
∆P
c
it−1 0.69 0.15 0.34 1.35 0.87 −0.47
(0.01) (0.64) (0.43) (0.14) (0.03) (0.40)
∆Y
w
t−1 −0.41 −0.15 −0.14 −0.70 0.34 0.02
(0.01) (0.22) (0.35) (0.05) (0.04) (0.91)
ECDt−1 −0.08 −0.09 −0.06 −0.13 −0.11 −0.25
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Implied 12.9 11.4 16.6 7.7 8.8 3.9
speed 
(months)
R2 0.36 0.48 0.38 0.27 0.29 0.57
1Each long-run regression includes one lead and lag for the first difference of each continuous vari-
able. The short-run equations include two lags for each continuous variable. All regressions include
fixed effects for each country and monthly dummies, and controls for country-specific first-order auto-
correlation in the error structure and contemporaneous correlation across countries in the long-run
regressions. R-squares are not defined in the long-run regressions (see Greene, 1997). The speed of
adjustment is calculated as the inverse of the opposite of the coefficient on the error-correction term.
Each column in Table 7 reports the regression coefficient corresponding to the explanatory variable in
a particular row, and the statistical significance of the variable is given by its p-value, reported in
parentheses beneath the coefficient value.WHAT HAPPENED TO ASIAN EXPORTS DURING THE CRISIS?
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Table 7. (Continued.)
Long-run supply: Dependent variable = Pit
Explanatory
Coefficients in the individual regressions
variables Chemicals Manufactures Machinery Vehicles Semiconductors Clothing
Xijt 0.01 0.02 −0.02 −0.03 0.01 −0.05
(0.45) (0.13) (0.12) (0.01) (0.23) (0.01)
DCjt −0.06 −0.12 −0.20 −0.33 −0.34 −0.10
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ejt −0.23 −0.38 −0.25 −0.26 −0.51 −0.20
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ijt 0.44 0.53 0.39 0.18 0.99 0.21
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00)
Log 1285.06 1430.44 1375.32 717.52 961.29 970.35
likelihood
Countries 5 5 5 3 4 4
Number of  630 630 630 400 420 500
observations
Short-run supply: Dependent variable =∆ Pit
Explanatory
Coefficients in the individual regressions
variables Chemicals Manufactures Machinery Vehicles Semiconductors Clothing
∆Xit−1 0.03 0.01 0.00 −0.01 0.02 −0.01
(0.09) (0.60) (0.88) (0.50) (0.23) (0.76)
∆DC
c
it−1 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.03
(0.67) (0.46) (0.72) (0.75) (0.61) (0.77)
∆Et−1 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.32 0.13
(0.59) (0.65) (0.47) (0.32) (0.00) (0.31)
∆It−1 −0.39 −0.41 −0.54 −0.67 −0.25 −0.69
(0.11) (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.42) (0.03)
ECSt−1 −0.05 −0.08 −0.04 −0.05 −0.04 −0.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Implied 19.2 13.2 22.7 18.7 26.3 16.1
speed 
(months)
R2 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.17
The absolute value of elasticity for competitors’price is large, supporting the argu-
ment that there is a considerable degree of intra-Asian competition. Exports for all
commodity groups, except clothing, are sensitive to world demand. Clothing has a
negative and insignificant sign, reflecting in part that Asian exporters have been
moving away from this sector.
The supply equations do not perform as well as the demand equations. The
coefficient on the price variable is insignificantly different from zero for all Rupa Duttagupta and Antonio Spilimbergo
88
commodity groups except clothing and road vehicles, implying that export supply
curves are basically horizontal in the long run.26 Export prices are negatively and
significantly sensitive to nominal depreciation. Note also that the pass-through
elasticity is higher in manufactures and semiconductors than in the other industries—
consistent with the argument that pass-through elasticities are higher in industries
with relatively more market power (see Knetter, 1993). Export supply price is
positively and significantly associated with increases in domestic input prices.
Overall, these results with monthly data support similar findings in the literature
(see Muscatelli, Stevenson, and Montagna, 1995; and Giorgianni and Milesi-
Ferretti, 1997) based on lower frequency data.
The panel results support a significant influence of changes in private domestic
credit on export supply.27 However, under the single equation approach only 3 equa-
tions out of 30 have a negative sign for private credit and are significant (after
excluding the results for Malaysia). Based on these results, and also noting that the
speed of adjustment in the export supply function is on average 1.5 years, the evi-
dence for a domestic credit crunch being responsible for the decline in East Asian
exports is somewhat mixed. This result is consistent with the findings of Ghosh and
Ghosh (1999) for East Asia and the observation of Krueger and Tornell (1999), who
find that the Mexican tradable sector responded strongly to depreciation in the cri-
sis of December 1994, a severe credit crunch notwithstanding.
The short-run equations show that price and quantities do not adjust immedi-
ately to shocks. However, the speed of adjustment, measured by the negative of
the inverse of the error correction terms in the short-run equations, is relatively
faster for the demand equations, ranging from 4 months to 17 months, compared
to the supply equation, ranging from 14 months to 23 months.
Robustness
For a robustness check of the above results, the demand and supply equations are
estimated (in unreported regressions) using the equation-by-equation estimation
technique of Stock and Watson (1989) and instrumental variable regressions, and
the results are similar but weaker than the results under the co-integration approach.
As a further robustness test, the U.S. import prices are used as alternative
deflators for export revenues to obtain export volumes. This alternative method does
not significantly change the results.
East Asia exports could be sensitive to individual economic activity in the United
States, Japan, or other Asian countries such that both aggregate world demand and its
26No obvious explanation can be provided for the perverse relationship between price and volume in
the export supply equations for road vehicles and clothing. However, for clothing, the gradual shift in
exports away from this sector may have led to a structural break in the export supply function that could
not be captured by the standard export supply equation estimated here. Besides, Asia’s clothing exports
were subject to quotas under the Multi Fiber Arrangement (MFA), which could have distorted the standard
price-quantity relationship for the export supply equation.
27Noting that only a small share of private domestic credit is disbursed to each of the specific indus-
tries considered in this sample, the possibility of private credit being endogenous to a specific commodity
export is expected to be low.WHAT HAPPENED TO ASIAN EXPORTS DURING THE CRISIS?
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composition become important determinants of demand for Asian exports. In un-
reported regressions, alternative specifications with several scale variables corre-
sponding to different geographical areas are used (for each industry). These results
reveal that there is no significant difference between using some composition of
world income and using aggregate world income.
Other alternative specifications are also used for the demand and supply equa-
tions. In particular, real interest rate is used as an alternative to domestic credit,
and the results of the latter also are as inconclusive as the results using private
domestic credit.
Interpretations
As noted in the introduction, four factors are considered as possible explanations
for the lag of Asian exports following the huge depreciations. First, a credit crunch
could choke off export supply. Second, world demand slowdown could affect East
Asian exports. Third, the export demand could be inelastic in the short run. Fourth,
export demand for a single country might have slowed down due to currency de-
preciation of its competitors. Table 8 summarizes the expected coefficient of the
explanatory variables in the estimated demand and supply equations for each of
the above explanations.
The results provide weak support for the credit crunch explanation for three
reasons: First, there is mixed evidence on the significance of the relationship
between domestic credit and export supply price. Second, the calculated speed of
adjustment for the supply curve (between 1.5 and 2 years) indicates that any effect
of a credit crunch would not be reflected within a year. Finally, an upward shift of
the supply curve along the demand curve should increase the equilibrium price,
not decrease it. An upward shift of the supply curve without any change in prices
is possible only if the demand curve is horizontal and the estimated equations do
not reveal horizontal demand curves for any commodities.
Regarding the second explanation, although the estimated results show large
and positive income elasticity of demand for exports, Figure 4 shows that world
import demand did not collapse at the end of the 1990s. Moreover, Table 1 indicates
that world demand for commodities typically exported by Asia relative to total
world demand also did not decline. Thus, noting that neither total demand nor the
Table 8. Implied Coefficients of Alternative Explanations
for Slow Response of Exports to Depreciation
Xi Pi




w Xi DC E I
Credit crunch −
Contraction of world demand +
J-curve effect 0 (short run) −
Competitive depreciation −+ −Rupa Duttagupta and Antonio Spilimbergo
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demand for those commodities exported mostly by Asia declined, we rule out the
world demand contraction explanation.
The third explanation, implying a vertical demand curve in the short run (e.g.,
during the period 1997–mid-1999, which was characterized by sharply falling
export prices without comparable increases in export volumes), is ruled out from
the short-run estimation, which indicates a relatively quick adjustment along the
export demand equation (within one year).
The fourth explanation—competitive depreciation—implies that exports of an
individual country did not pick up because competitors were depreciating and cut-
ting their export prices as well. In the supply equation, depreciation has to translate
into lower export prices, while in the demand equation, export quantity has to be very
sensitive to own and competitors’ prices.28 Our results support both these require-
ments.29 Hence, a nominal depreciation in each country shifts down its export supply
curve by some proportion, thereby reducing export prices. At the same time, nominal
depreciation by its competitors shifts its demand curve to the left, such that quantity
sold in exports does not increase by much despite a sharp decline in export price.
It is somewhat puzzling that the sharp decline in East Asian export prices did not
significantly increase overall Asian exports to the world (owing to the fact that the
region as a whole had become more competitive relative to the rest of the world).
This could be explained by the fact that while the elasticity of substitution between
goods from individual East Asian countries is very high, the elasticity of substitution
between East Asia as a whole and the rest of the world is less strong. This argument
is confirmed by several studies that have looked specifically at the issue of differ-
ent elasticities of substitution for goods from different countries. For instance, Faini,
Clavijo, and Senhadji-Semlali (1992) find that the competition in exports between
two less developed countries (LDC) is much stronger than the competition between
a developed country (DC) and an LDC. Giorgianni and Milesi-Ferretti (1997) find
that using two exchange rates—one vis-à-vis Korea and industrialized coun-
tries and another vis-à-vis Korea and nonindustrialized countries—can better
explain  demand for Korean exports than using one exchange rate. Finally,
Spilimbergo and Vamvakidis (2003) show that the assumption of equal elasticity
of substitution of export demands for LDCs and DCs is not supported by the data,
and export equations work much better using two exchange rates.
III. Conclusion
This paper attempts to identify demand and supply curves for specific export groups
at a monthly frequency, whereas most of the empirical trade literature has so far
focused on lower time frequencies. The analysis of the developments up to and after
a currency crisis could be done only with high-frequency data. However, working
28The results also show that export supply price is responsive to domestic input costs, which likely
decreased relative to imported costs following the nominal depreciation.
29The only way to verify the depreciation explanation is by estimating demand and supply as is done
here. Looking at changes in market shares cannot work because countries that engage in competitive
devaluation could end up with the same market shares.with recent monthly trade data poses several challenges. First, there is no readily
available database. Second, there is a risk that trade equations, which may work well
at low frequency, would not yield conventional results at high frequency. These chal-
lenges are dealt with by constructing an original database based on monthly prices
and quantities for the industries in the sample. When the data are not available from
the original sources, best alternative proxies are constructed to check the robustness
of the results. The specification challenge is dealt with by using a vector co-integra-
tion framework in a panel context. The results are robust to different specifications
and different ways of constructing the data set.
The main results are that demand for East Asian exports is very sensitive to
prices—both their own and competitors’—and to world import demand. Export
supply prices are very sensitive to depreciation and domestic input prices. These
results indicate that competitive depreciation played a key role in exacerbating the
real effects of the crisis by working through a trade channel and that these effects
occur relatively quickly—between 4 months and 16 months. This paper calls for
an interpretation of the Asian crisis that puts a stronger emphasis on the role of
trade, the importance of competitive depreciation in prolonging the crisis, and the
causes underlying the slowdown in export supply. An optimistic forecast is also
presented about the future of East Asian exports—the results indicate that Asian
exports should return to their precrisis growth rates as their economies strengthen
and currencies stabilize, as was evidenced in the fast recovery of Asian exports
during 1999–2000.
APPENDIX
The sample covers monthly data between January 1990 and July 2002, with a few exceptions
when data could not be retrieved. A complete description of the variables and the data sources
is given below.
Price and volume of exports: Export prices are used to deflate the export revenues and obtain
volumes of exports. For commodities disaggregated at the one-digit level, such as chemicals,
manufactured items, and machinery, commodity-specific export price indices for Korea,
Singapore, and Thailand are available. At the two- and three-digit levels, the best available
country- and commodity-specific export price index is used. For instance, the export price index
of SITC 7 (machinery) is used to obtain volumes of SITC 78 (road vehicles) and SITC 776 (semi-
conductors) and so on. For Indonesia and Malaysia, commodity-specific export prices could be
retrieved and the unit value of exports is used to deflate all export revenues. Hong Kong SAR has
export price indices for clothing and semiconductors. For other commodities, the unit value of
exports is used. The use of alternative proxies for price indices when individual price information
is missing is not uncommon. For instance, Muscatelli, Stevenson, and Montagna (1994) have used
import (and sometimes export) price indices of the United States to obtain volumes of develop-
ing country manufacturing exports. However, there is a problem with this deflator. Ideally we
would like to have Xij = Rij/Pij, where Rij is the export revenue earned by the jth country in the
ith good. However, when Pij is not available, and a proxy like the U.S. import price index for i
(denoted by Pi,USA) is used, a new variable, X*
ij, is created such that, X*
ij =Rij/Pi,USA. Pi,USA depends
on the exports of commodity i from all exporters of i to the United States. Hence, an increase in
the exports of i from all other countries (except j) leads to a decline in the import price faced by
the United States (Pi,USA), which increases the value of X*
ij even though Xij does not increase. This
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from the United States. However, in order to check the robustness of the results, the U.S. import
price is used as an alternative proxy for Asian export price variables.
Competitors’export prices: For every commodity group geometric average weights are con-
structed (average of 1992–96) by taking the annual share of country j’s exports of commodity
i (to the world) as a proportion of total Asian exports of that commodity. The weights are then
used to obtain a geometric mean of export prices of the competitors. Thus, by construction,
(9)
where h is all the other Asian competitors of good i for country j. The term H refers to the five
other competitors. The variable Xih is the total (annual) export of commodity i by country h.When
country h does not have a commodity-specific export price, we simply use the overall export
price, that is, the unit value of exports. The term K refers to the six countries in the sample. The
weights are constructed with annual data obtained from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics.
The country-specific sources on the prices and quantities of exports are as follows:
Hong Kong SAR: Data on export revenue of chemicals, manufactures, and machinery are from
Hong Kong SAR’s Census and Statistic Department’s Monthly Digest of Statistics. Data on
exports of road vehicles, clothing, and semiconductors come from the same department’s Trade
Analysis Section (Hong Kong SAR’s External Trade). Unit-value index numbers for domestic
exports (from the same source) are used to deflate export revenues of chemicals, manufactures,
machinery, and road vehicles. The specific export price index is used for clothing, while that
of electronic components is used for semiconductors. These price data are retrieved from the
Census and Statistics Department. The price data are available from 1988:10–2002:01.
Indonesia: Export data are obtained from the Bank of Indonesia’s Economics and Statistics
Department. The following data points for export revenue are missing in the sample of estima-
tion for chemicals, manufactures, and machinery: 94:01–02; for road vehicles, clothing, and
semiconductors: 1994:01–02; 1995:01–02; 1995:12; 1996:01–02; 1996:04–05. The unit value
of the export index (in dollars) is used to obtain volumes of exports of these commodities.
The source for the latter is the International Financial Statistics Database (IFS), series 74DZF.
This series is available from 1980:01–1998:12 and is interpolated to obtain the missing values
for the data points 1981:07–08 and 1987:01–02.
Malaysia: Export revenue data come from Malaysia’s  Monthly External Trade Statistics,
Department of Statistics, covering 1994:01–2002:07. Values for 2000:12 and 2001:12 are miss-
ing for all the series. The unit value of the export index is used to deflate export revenues and
obtain volumes. The source for the latter is IFS (series 74DZF). The series is interpolated to
obtain the missing data points between 1992:04 and 1993:06, and 1996:07 and 1998:02. After
interpolation the series is complete only until 1999:03. In order to construct the graphs, we use
the rate of growth of the export price from Indonesia. Given the data limitation we do not use
Malaysia in the panel regressions.
South Korea: Export revenue data come from the Bank of Korea’s Monthly Bulletin and cover
the period 1990:01–2002:10.
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92Singapore: Data on revenue and prices come from the Monthly Digest of Statistics, Singapore
Department of Economics. Data on revenue and export prices cover the period 1989:01 to
2002:02 (missing between 1998:02 and 1998:06). The missing points are interpolated to com-
plete the series.
Thailand: Monthly Bulletin, Bank of Thailand, is the source for exports of chemicals, manu-
factures, and machinery (available from 1989:01–2002:12). The following proxies were used
(from the same source) for the two- and three-digit export commodities—line 18a (integrated
circuits and parts) as a proxy for SITC 776 (semiconductors); line 2 (textile products) as a
proxy for SITC 84 (clothing); and line 51a (passenger cars and parts) as a proxy for SITC 7812
(cars). Commodity-specific export prices are available during the same period. An aggregate
export price index for Thailand is obtained from the IFS (series 74DZF).
United States import price index: The data for this index used to deflate export revenues for
the alternative definition of volume come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For chemicals,
manufactures, machinery, and clothing we retrieved quarterly series between 1990:03 and
1992:08, and monthly thereafter until 2003:01. For semiconductors, the data are quarterly from
1989:09 to 1993:12, and monthly thereafter (until 2003:01). The quarterly series for vehicles
starts in 1989:09 and ends in 1993:12 and is monthly thereafter until 2003:01. All quarterly data
are interpolated.
Scale variable: As discussed before, we first construct a trade-weighted world demand for each
export commodity for the scale variable. However the use of this variable does not alter the per-
formance of the estimated equations. This is because export data are highly trended, and therefore
as long as we use a scale variable that is suitably trended, they perform well in the demand equa-
tion. Therefore we use world import demand for the estimation retrieved from the IFS database
(series 71D). The world unit value of imports (series 75D) is used to deflate revenues and obtain
volume of imports. The series for real world import is available from 1980:01–2002:09.
Domestic credit: The data source is IFS (domestic credit, based on claims on the private sector,
series, 32DZF). This series (in domestic currency) covers the period 1980:01–2002:12 for all
countries. For Hong Kong SAR, the series is annual between 1990 and 1993, quarterly between
1994:01 and 1995:12, and then monthly. Real domestic credit to the private sector is obtained
by deflating with the country-specific consumer price index (CPI) data, which were also
obtained from the IFS (series 64ZF), covering 1980:01–2002:12. For Hong Kong SAR, CPI data
are available from 1990:01. Hong Kong SAR’s real domestic credit has to be interpolated for the
co-integration tests. However, all estimations are carried out without interpolating this variable.
Input price: In the absence of wage prices at monthly frequency, the wholesale price index is
used to proxy for input price. The series is retrieved from the IFS (line 63).
Nominal exchange rate: This monthly series comes from the IFS (period average market rate,
series RFZF) and covers the period 1980:01–2003:01.
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